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ABSTRACT Privacy risk in Online Social Networks has become an important social concern. Users, with
different perceptions of risk, share information without considering the audience that has access to the
information disclosed or how far a publication will go. According to this, we propose two metrics (Audience
and Reachability) based on information flows and friendship layers that indicate the privacy risk of sharing
information, addressing the posts’ scope and invisible audience. We assess these metrics through agent
simulations in well-knownmodels of networks. The findings show a strong relationship between metrics and
structural centrality network properties. We also studied scenarios where there is no previous information
about users activity or the information about the traces of the messages cannot be obtained. To deal with
privacy assessment in these scenarios, we analyze the relationship between the proposed privacy metrics and
local centrality properties as an estimation of privacy risk. The results showed that effectiveness centrality
can be used as a suitable approximation of the proposed privacy measures.
INDEX TERMS Privacy, information sharing, social networks, network topology.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most common online activities in the European
Union in 2014 was participation in social networking [13].
According to Eurostat [21] nearly half (46 %) of individuals
aged 16 to 74 used the Internet for social networking (i.e.,
using sites such as Facebook or Twitter). In general, the num-
ber of social network users is increasing and it will reach the
2.72 billion in 2019 [11].
There are many users of social networking sites who are
not aware of privacy and often share information without
considering who will or will not have access to it [22]. The
effect of the lack of privacy awareness led users to negative
experiences related to privacy [40], and in some cases, there
are users who consider leaving as a consequence of inade-
quate control over their data [10].
Regarding problems with privacy awareness and privacy
settings configuration in Online Social Networks (OSNs),
the provision of metrics and mechanisms that facilitate
the management of individuals’ privacy and enhance the
awareness of privacy risks become an important issue [39],
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[46]. Applications related to OSN usually provide mecha-
nisms to configure the users’ privacy profile. Nevertheless,
the majority of approaches focus on protecting the infor-
mation referred to user profile and not to the visibility of
his/her publications. In the literature we can find proposals
that try to address these issues with the automation of privacy
settings [6], [14], [38]. However, these usually require some
intervention from the user and do not solve the problem
of increasing privacy awareness. Other works deal with the
improvement of user’s awareness about the misalignment
of users’ expected audience with the actual audience [8],
[23], [29]. These latter works facilitate the alignment between
the expected and the actual audience. However, there is still
an open problem. These proposals do not take into account
that users that are part of the target audience might re-share
the published information, losing control over the original
publication scope.
The structure of the network is one of the main factors
that have influence on the scope of a sharing action [19].
This scope can be seen as the effect of a message diffusion
process. Spreading processes such as epidemics or informa-
tion diffusion have been analyzed in the area of Complex
Networks [25], [27]. Several works have studied spreading
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dynamics and influential or relevant individuals in these pro-
cesses [34], [43].
In social networks, the concept of influential users are
referred to those users strategically located in the network,
which are responsible of information diffusion since they
can efficiently and conduct the dissemination of a message.
Since influential users may contribute to increase the privacy
risk [24], determining if there are influential users in the path
that a user’s publication follows would be essential to assess
the privacy risk of this publication. Related to this issue, it is
widely accepted that structural metrics such as degree [33],
PageRank [28], closeness, or betweenness [16]–[18], [26] are
suitable to detect influential users [7].
The perception of risk may be different from one user to
another [9], [30], [36]. Some users are more comfortable with
the possibility that their publications can be seen by others
and they may be even interested in achieving that effect.
In contrast, other users prefer not to disclose their information
beyond their direct friends [15]. Therefore, different levels
of risk perception should be considered for determining the
privacy risk.
Unlike other proposals that present mechanisms to facili-
tate the alignment between the expected and the actual audi-
ence, in this article we focus on the analysis of the potential
reach of a publication in social networks as a consequence of
re-sharing actions, assuming that the publicationwas received
by the expected audience. We present two privacy metrics:
Reachability for measuring the user posts probability to reach
certain depth level; and Audience for clarifying the invisible
audience, measuring the percentage of users that really will
access to posts. Themetrics act as an indicator of the potential
risk of user’s actions, and are based on information flows and
a friendship-layered model that provides information about
the reachability of a user publication based on the distance
between the user and the potential audience. Finally, to con-
sider scenarios where third applications cannot have access
to the traffic of users’ messages in online social networks,
we analyze if there is a correlation between structural network
factors and the proposed metrics. The results obtained in
the experiments conclude that local structural properties are
correlated with the proposed privacy metrics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
previous approaches related to privacy score metrics.
Section 3 exposes the privacy risks in social networks with
a usual scenario and proposes a solution. Section 4 describes
the proposed layered privacy risk metrics. Section 5 presents
the experiments that analyze if there is a correlation between
structural properties and the proposed privacy metrics.
Finally, section 6 presents conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
As communication through social networks acquires greater
relevance in our daily social interactions, it is important that
users understand the effect of communicative actions using
these social tools. Users often see OSN as tools that facilitate
communication that has traditionally been face-to-face [2].
However, communication using OSN does not have the same
impact as traditional communication. It is important for users
to be aware of the scope of their communicative actions
through OSN [20], [35].
Previous works tried to deal with this problem from differ-
ent perspectives. There are approaches that provide wizards
to facilitate the management of privacy profile settings. Fang
and LeFevre [14] present a privacy wizard based on an active
learning paradigm. Users can assign ‘‘labels’’ (i.e., share or
not share) to a set of selected friends. Then, previous labelling
processes are used as the input for their classifier. Finally,
this wizard determines labels for the remaining friends of
these user that are in the same circle. However, this approach
assumes that friends in the same social circle have show
similar responses of sharing publications. Thus, this approach
does not consider that friends can play different roles. Liu
and Terzi [50] propose a privacy score based on user’s pro-
file items but without considering the dynamics of how an
information item is re-shared through the social network. The
authors also propose a recommendation based on a compar-
ison between the user’s privacy score and his/her neighbors
score. If the score is below that of his/her neighbors, the sys-
tem can recommend stronger privacy settings. However, not
all users in a social network have the same perception of
privacy risk. Therefore, a recommendation based only on
your neighbors could not fit to your privacy preferences. A
privacy score is also proposed by Vidyalakshmi et al. [38].
The authors present a framework for obtaining a privacy score
metric from an individual perspective. This metric considers
users’ personal attitude towards privacy and communication
information. Privacy score is estimated using cubic bezier
curve that integrates: (i) user’s disposition to privacy; (ii)
user’s attitude towards communication; (iii) a ranking of
friends according to their privacy attitude; and (iv) the fre-
quency of communication with friends. The use of a cubic
bezier curve facilitates the representation of different types
of users’ behaviors towards privacy. The inclusion of this
privacy score metric could imply a manual sorting process
of friends based on the personal view of the user. The pro-
posed score only considers an ego-user view of the social
network and does not evaluate other collateral effects such
as information diffusion processes in the network. Bilogre-
vic et al. [6] propose an information-sharing system that
decides (semi-)automatically whether to share information
with others, whenever they request it, and at what granularity.
They consider a vector of 18 features to feed the classifier.
The vector encodes whether the information is shared or not.
Initially, users make n decisions about features to train the
classifier, and then a logistic classifier makes the remaining
decisions automatically predicting the users’ sharing deci-
sions. The approach requires the user intervention and also
assumes that users are privacy aware of the consequences of
their decisions.
Some approaches focus on providing information of users
that may have received information that was not previ-
ously addressed to them. These works help users to increase
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their privacy risk awareness and to define their social
groups/contexts more precisely. Wang et al. [41] focus on the
effects of soft paternalistic interventions over users’ behavior
on information disclosure decisions. This proposal uses three
mechanisms that alert users about the risk of sharing infor-
mation. The mechanisms are: (i) showing images of users
that can see the information; (ii) introducing a time delay
before sharing information; and (iii) showing a message if
the information contains negative words. The effects of these
mechanismswere analyzed over a population of 21 users. The
authors payed attention to the influence over users’ behaviors
depending on how the privacy risk information was shown
to the users. This study concludes that privacy mechanisms
are good to prevent unintended disclosure. However, this
mechanisms do not provide accurate information about the
reachability of the information sharing action.
Other approaches use norms as a mechanism for defining
the different of personal information and reasoning about
this information [4]. Calikli et al. [8] propose an adaptive
architecture that provides recommendations for sharing infor-
mation and help users to re-configure user’s groups. This
proposal is based on two main concepts: social contexts (i.e.,
group membership information) and conflicts (i.e., privacy
norms). Thus, this proposal requires the defintion of accurate
user’s social contexts and conflict rules. Kafali et al. [23] pro-
vide an approach based on model checking for certain prop-
erties. This system uses as input privacy agreements of the
users (i.e., clauses about which relations are entitled to which
privileges), user relationships, the content updated by users,
as well as inference rules. The system determines whether or
not a property of interest (i.e., whether OSN’s commitment
to hide a user’s information item) can be violated in a given
social network. Then, the user use this output to decide his
actions. Mester et al. [29] presents a platform where agents
interact among them to reach a consensus regarding a mes-
sage to be published. Agents are aware of user’s privacy
concerns, expectations, and friends. When a user is about to
publish new content, the agent determines which other users
would be affected by the message and contacts the respective
agents of those users. The negotiation protocol allow agents to
discuss constraints and determines a suitable way to publish
the content when none of the users’ privacy is violated. In this
approach, the privacy rules (i.e., privacy concerns of a user)
should be predefined using a Semantic Web Rule Language.
In addition, this approach is only based on direct contacts and
does not consider other levels of friendship that may have
access to this information through a friend re-sharing action.
A more flexible approach is presented by Yang et al. [45].
They present a privacy metric of user i sharing information
with a neighbor j as a trade-off between user i’s concerns (i.e.,
potential privacy risks) and incentives of sharing information
with j (i.e., potential social benefits). The potential privacy
risk of i is based on the re-sharing probability of an infor-
mation receiver j (i.e., the ratio of the number of times that j
re-shares over the number of times that j receives information
from a user i) and its trust level (i.e., user i’s opinion on j).
The social gain considers the receivers that belong to
a selected sharing circle and the number of interactions
between i and j. They present the privacy risk as an indi-
vidual metric, without considering the consequences that
other potential users might re-share the received information.
Pensa et al. [51] propose a privacy metric that includes infor-
mation sensitivity and the location of a user in the network
structure using a centrality metric. Although they metric
proposed is interesting, the authors use the page-rank metric
without analyzing other centrality metrics that might fit better
to the context of information diffusion andmight be applied in
scenarios where there is no global information of the network.
There are other works focused on the analysis of the effects
of information diffusion in social networks using SIRmodels.
Zhu et al. [52] define a privacy protection mechanism based
on information sharing in ONS and classify users according
to different privacy setting policies. They use a SIR model
to describe the dynamics and evolution of information prop-
agation. However, in this proposal the authors classify users
based on a static privacy policy. They do not consider that,
depending on the information, the privacy policy of a user
might change. Similarly, Bioglio and Pensa [48] use a SIR
model to analyze the role of attitude on privacy of a user and
her friends on information propagation in OSN. They use an
extension of a SIR model that considers the privacy attitude
of users using parametric values [49]. In the simulations,
the authors consider that all the neighbouring users of the
initial user where the diffusion is going to start are going to
have the same attitude as the user that starts the diffusion.
This is not very realistic due to a user usually have different
groups of friends with different attitudes in social networks.
From our point of view, privacy risk does not only concern
the problem that information might reach people who were
initially not expected to receive it. Previous works focus on
this problem providing mechanisms to avoid audience mis-
alignment. In this paper, we assume that users who received
the information are in the expected target audience and we
focus on the next step. Our proposal is focused on the analysis
of the effects over the users’ privacy when users from the
intended audience re-share the original publication.
The proposal privacy metrics (Reachability and Audience)
improves previous works in the following ways: (i) it focuses
on information sharing behaviors instead of static user’s
profile configuration; (ii) it does not require previous user
intervention, norms definition, or manual classification of
friends; (iii) the proposed metrics does not provide a unique
value to represent the risk of sharing activities; it provides
the metrics considering layers of friendship (i.e., confidence)
that provides a more accurate view of the disclosure effect
over user’s privacy.
III. PRIVACY THREATS IN OSN
Privacy risk not only concerns the problem that informa-
tion might reach people who were initially not expected to
receive it, but it also involves the problem of losing control
over the scope of the information. Figure 1 describes this
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FIGURE 1. Example of a potential privacy risk in online social networks.
privacy risk problem in online social networks. The elements
shown have the following meaning: nodes represent users;
lines represent friendship relations; scribbled-nodes represent
users with content access; encircled-nodes (colored) repre-
sent users who share content.
In Figure 1a, we show the structure of a social network
that is organized into four communities. Figure 1b shows the
action ‘‘sharing message on his/her wall’’ performed by the
red node. The node determines the audience depending on
his selected privacy policy (e.g., friends). Therefore, only his
friends can see the message (i.e., nodes scribbled in green).
If a green node performs a sharing action (i.e., nodes encircled
in green), themessage could reach other communities causing
a privacy risk problem (see Figure 1c, new nodes scribbled
in green in community 1 and 4). The privacy risk of each
node variates, as can be seen in the scenario, depending on
its position in the social network and his behavior. Therefore,
it is important to provide metrics about potential privacy risks
to users for improving their control and awareness of the
privacy.
Taking into consideration the problem described, there are
a lot of moments using social media where this problem may
appear. For example, there are situations where users need
to use social media as therapy making negatives comments
about work, politics or religion [44]. This actions can become
viral (or ‘‘far-reaching’’, depending on user’s perception)
causing privacy risks and users’ regret [47]. The use of social
media knowing the reachability of users’ publications would
increase the awareness of users’ actions reachability and
would reduce users’ privacy risk. In addition, there are many
articles that analyse silent listeners or invisible audiences
and the effect of their actions on users privacy [5], [37].
When users share photos about their holidays with relatives
and friends, they may expect that these photos will be seen
indirectly by friends of friends; but previous research studies
revealed that users are only aware of a small part of the real
audience that sees the publication [5].
To deal with the above privacy risk problems, we define
two privacy metrics: Reachability and Audience. These met-
rics estimate the privacy risk of a user when shares a message
in a social network. These metrics can be applied to users’
friendship layers. Reachability metric obtains the probability
of a message to reach a specific ratio/percentage of users
given a specific sharing action. The user can specify this ratio.
The Audience metric obtains the percentage of users that will
see a message given a specific sharing action and a friendship
layer revealing the invisible audience. These metrics aim to
increase the users’ awareness about the reachability of their
publications in the social network even though they have
restricted the visibility of their publications.
IV. PRIVACY RISK METRICS WHEN SHARING
INFORMATION
To define how Reachability and Audience work, first we are
going to explain some important concepts. We assume that
there is a social network G that consists of N nodes, where
every node ai ∈ N = {a1, ..., an} represents a user. Users
are connected through bidirectional and undirected links that
represent friendship relationships and correspond to the edges
E ⊆ N × N of G. We define the adjacency matrix A to
represent these links. Given two users ai and aj, if there is
a link between these users, we represent this as Aai,aj = 1
and Aai,aj = 0 if there is not a link.
The privacymetrics proposed to evaluate the risk of sharing
information actions (e.g., publishing amessage in his/her own
wall, commenting an existing post, sharing a post, etc.) act as
an indicator of the potential risk of the messages diffused over
the social network (i.e., potential scope and visibility). The
higher the Reachability and Audience values, the higher the
threat to user ai’s privacy by performing a sharing information
action.
A. METRICS CALCULATION
In the social media context, users perform message diffusion
actions that have a potential risk associated with the potential
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subsequent action that may diffuse the message over the
social network. In addition, another point to take into consid-
eration is that not all users have the same view of risk when
sharing information. Some users may consider that sharing
information with ‘‘friends of friends’’ might be risky while
other users may consider that the true risk is at the next layer
of friendship. Moreover, some users may consider risky that
few users (one or two) of a certain layer of friendship see
some information while other users may consider risky only
when the majority of users of a certain layer see it. In order
to consider different perceptions of risk in sharing actions in
social networks, we have defined the concepts of friendship
layer and information reachability.
Friendship layer is based on the social distance between
users. We define the distance between any pair of users ai and
aj as the minimum number of links to be traversed to reach
one aj from ai and is represented as d(ai, aj).
We define a friendship layer Lai (l) as the subset of users
whose distance to the source user ai is l:
Lai (l)⊆N , ∀aj∈Lai (l) : d(ai, aj)= l ∧ @d
′(ai, aj)<d(ai, aj)
Therefore, users in layer 1 are those that are direct neigh-
bors of ai, users in layer 2 are those that are linked with 2 links
from ai and so on.
We define the information reachability of a user ai as
the number of users that saw a message m published by ai.
We define a N × N reachability matrix γm for each message
m that is diffused on the social network. The rows and the
columns of γm represent users. We use γm(ai, aj) to refer to
the entry in the aith row and ajth column of γm, and it has
two possible values [0, 1], where 1 represents that message
m was sent by ai and reached aj and 0 that did not reach aj.
0 = {γ1, . . . , γm} represents the set of all γm associated to
each messaged propagated in the network.
Based on the friendship layer and the information reach-
ability, we define two metrics, Reachability and Audience,
to provide feedback about the privacy risk of a user when
shares information in a social network.
Reachability (Re(ai, l, r)) represents the probability of a
message diffused by a user ai of reaching a percentage r (i.e.,
reachability ratio) of users in layer l. Considering Lai (l) as the
set of users in layer l from a user ai and r as a reachability
ratio of users, Reachability metric can be calculated as
Re(ai, l, r) =
|0′′|
|0′|
, (1)
where 0′ represents the set of reachability matrixes associ-
ated to messages in which ai participated in their diffusion,
0′ ⊆ 0, such that ∀γm ∈ 0′ → ∃ak |γm(ai, ak ) = 1; and
0′′ represents the set of reachability matrixes associated to
messages in which ai participated in the information flow
and were viewed by a percentage of users of layer l greater
than r
0′′ ⊆ 0′, such that ∀γm ∈ 0′′→
∑
aj∈Lai (l)
γm(ai, aj)
|Lai (l)|
≥ r
The Reachability metric (Re(ai, l, r)) is appropriate to
evaluate the risk that a message shared by a user reaches
certain friendship layer. Figure 2 shows an example of Reach-
ability metric calculation for user a1, at friendship layer 3,
and considering a ratio r of 0.15 (Re(a1, 3, 0.15)). In this
scenario, a1 wants to obtain the probability that a publication
in its wall will reach a few users (i.e., r = 0.15) at friendship
level 3. The value of Re (Re = 2/3) means that there is a high
probability (greater than 0.5) that the information reaches
level 3.
Audience (Au) represents the percentage of users in layer
l that is expected to see a message diffused by ai considering
the total number of users of that layerAu(ai, l) (Eq. 2), or con-
sidering the total number of users of the network AuG(ai, l)
(Eq. 3). The audience Au(ai, l) provides a local insight about
the risk in a specific layer of the social network. However,
the information that Au(ai, l) provides about the audience that
has seen a message in a specific layer could be biased by the
number of agents in that layer. Therefore, it could be also
interesting for the user to obtain a more global picture of the
risk of reaching certain layer considering the whole network.
For this reason, we have also proposed the AuG(ai, l) metric
considering the total of agents of the network.
Au(ai, l) =
∑
γm∈0′
 ∑aj∈Lai (l) γm(ai,aj)
|Lai (l)|

|0′|
(2)
AuG(ai, l) =
∑
γm∈0′
 ∑aj∈Lai (l) γm(ai,aj)
|N |

|0′|
(3)
The Audience metrics are appropriate to evaluate the pri-
vacy risk of a sharing action based on the coverage that this
action will achieve at certain friendship layer. Figure 2 shows
the calculation of the Audience metrics for messages sent
by user a1 considering the third level of friendship. In this
scenario, a1 wants to know exactly the percentage of users
(i.e., the audience) that will see a publication on his wall.
Therefore, a1 will consider the audience metrics.
Figure 2 shows a scenario that represents an example of
a social network with interactions between users. In the sce-
nario, there are three friendship layers and the reachability
matrix associated with each message generated in the social
network (i.e., γ1, γ2, and γ3).We assume that all of the users in
G have the privacy policy that only their direct friends can see
their walls. The message diffusion actions performed in this
scenario are the following. In Case 1 (1), user a1 publishes
a message m1 on his/her wall. Therefore, users a2 and a3
can see the message m1. The information about the users
that see m1 as a result of this sharing action performed by
a1 is stored in γ1. In γ1, we are measuring the reachability
of the m1 when a user interacts with the message (2). Then,
user a3 decides to share m1 on his/her wall. Users a4, a5,
a6, a7, and a8 can see the message m1. As in the previous
case, the information about the users that can see the message
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FIGURE 2. Example of social network activity and the calculation process of the Reachability and
Audience metrics. In this example, all information shared is visible by users’ direct friends. The directed
arrows indicate the direction of the message. The number between brackets indicates the stage in the
forwarding process of a message. Users perform the following actions on the social network: (case 1)
user a1 publishes/shares a message m1 on his/her wall and users a3 and a8 re-share m1;
(case 2) user a1 publishes/shares a message m2 on his/her wall and users a5 and a7 re-share m2;
(case 3) user a1 publishes/shares a message m3 on his/her wall and users a3 re-shares m3.
m1 as a result of the sharing action of a3 is updated in γ1.
Note that the corresponding row of a1 is also updated with
the new users that see m1. This update reflects the ‘indirect’
reachability of user a1 through the actions of a3 (3). Then,
user a8 shares m1 publishing it on his/her wall. Users a3 and
a9 can see it and the information in γ1 is updated. As in the
previous situation, rows corresponding to users a3 and a1 are
also updated. In the cases 2 and 3 (i.e., messages m2 and
m3 respectively), the process performs in a similar way to
the case 1. The difference is that the users that re-share the
message are different. In the case 2, the users that re-share
the m2 are a3, a5 and a7. In the case 3, the user that re-shares
the m3 is a3. The corresponding reachability matrixes (i.e.,
γ2 and γ3) are updated accordingly to the sharing actions per-
formed by the users. Following the example, themetric values
of Reachability and Audience proposed in this paper of the
user a1 for a three-level depth and a 15% correspond to 0.66
(Re), 0.33 (Au), and 0.09 (AuG) respectively. A Reachability
value of 0.66 means in this case that 2 out of 3 times the
message reached more than 15% of the users at third-level
depth. An Audience value of 0.33 means in this case that as
average 1 out of 3 users on the third-level will have access to
the message, that at the same time corresponds to a 10% of
the users on the whole network (0.09).
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TABLE 1. Networks structural properties.
V. EXPERIMENTS
Several experiments were performed to evaluate the privacy
risk metrics proposed: Reachability and Audience. There are
two sets of experiments. The first set evaluates the privacy
risk metrics in different network topologies considering dif-
ferent layers. The second set of experiments analyzes if there
is a correlation between the privacy metrics proposed and
structural properties of the networks. The use of structural
metrics would facilitate the estimation of the privacy metrics
proposed in scenarios where there is no data available about
users’ information flows.
For both set of experiments, we use a social network
simulation tool. This simulation tool was developed using
the open source Elgg framework 1 where is possible to build
real and virtual social environments. The simulation tool is
capable of reproducing social network scenarios such as the
creation of users and relationships, message sending, and
social interactions.
A. EXPERIMENT SETTINGS
The networks generated in the experiments follow three
models: Watts-Strogatz [42] (WS, small-world), Barabási-
Albert [3] (BA, scale-free), and Erdös-Rényi [12] (ER, ran-
dom). Table 1 shows the set of parameters and properties that
characterize each of the networks used for the simulations.
Each simulation run consists of 1000 seed messages pub-
lished by randomly selected agents. These seed messages
cause that other agents, in turn, perform actions to diffuse the
messages throughout the network. The diffusion of a message
m occurs when an agent ai sees a publication. Then, the agent
evaluates the risk of sharing m considering the reachability
or the audience metrics (Re, Au or AuG depending on the
scenario) values. If the value of the corresponding metric is
greater than his individual risk threshold (i.e., a random uni-
form distributed value in the range [0,1]), ai does not perform
the action, simulating that the agent decided not to propagate
the publication. Otherwise, ai shares the message m. In the
latter case, the message could be seen by other neighbor
agents and thematrix γi will be updated. Figure 3 summarizes
the specific diffusion model adopted in the simulation which
corresponds to a combination of a SIRmodel with a threshold
value.
We perform 50 simulations per each type of network and
considering friendship layers l = 2, l = 3 and l = 4
(see Table 2). For Reachability metric (Eq. 1), we considered
two reachability ratio values: r = all, where the label all
1https://elgg.org/
FIGURE 3. Flowchart of the diffusion model followed for each agent in
the simulation.
TABLE 2. Experiment settings.
represents the ratio percentage of 100% in the specified layer
(i.e., if the message reaches all the agents of the layer);
and r = one, where the label one represents the ratio
percentage to reach one agent in the specified layer. This
percentage value will change in each agent since the total
number of agents in a layer is not equal for all the agents.
For Audience metrics (Eq. 2 and 3), we consider the popu-
lation of a specific layer Au and the whole population of the
network AuG.
B. PRIVACY METRICS IN DIFFERENT NETWORK
TOPOLOGIES
In this section, we analyze the performance of the Reacha-
bility and Audience metrics in the three network topologies
considered. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results of the
simulations.
As it can be observed in Table 3, the value of Re for r = all
is 0 or a value close to 0 for layers 2-4 in all the networks
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TABLE 3. Statistical analysis of Reachability (Re) values for different
network topologies (mean± std ).
TABLE 4. Statistical analysis of Audience (Au) values for different
network topologies (mean± std ).
structures. These results show that it is difficult that amessage
reaches all the agents in the network. However, the value
of Re for r = one increases as the layer increases in the
three network structures. Initially, according to the privacy
settings of the agents in the network, all direct friends of
an agent ai (i.e., agents in layer l = 1) see the publication
of ai. Therefore, the Re in that layer is 1. Then, a subset of
these direct friends will re-share the publication. As a result,
among all the possible agents at layer 2, only those that are
direct contacts of the subset agents that re-shared will see
the publication. For this reason, the probability to reach an
agent in layer 2 (i.e., Re(ai, 2, one)) decreases to 0.5. In the
following layers the Re value increases considerable. The
main reason for this is that the publication has been widely
propagated in the network and there is a high probability that
agents in layers 3 or 4 receive the same publication from
different sources (i.e., agents). The values of Re are higher
in small-world and random networks due to there is a higher
degree of clustering in these topologies than in scale-free
networks. Therefore, there is a higher probability that an
agent receives the same information from different sources.
The Re metric for r = one captures the idea of the
reachability that a publication can achieve in a specific layer.
However, this information can be completed with the consid-
eration of the audience in a specific layer. In order to know
the percentage of agents that see a message in a specific
layer, we calculate the values of Audience for the agents (see
Table 4). The results obtained with Au show a similar trend
to the results obtained with Re. The percentage of agents that
see the message increases as the layer increases in the three
network structures. The highest values of Au are obtained by
agents in random networks.
The audience that has seen a message in a specific layer
could be biased by the number of agents in that layer. There-
fore, we have also analyzed the AuG metric considering the
total of agents of the network. As in the case ofAu, the highest
values of AuG are obtained in random networks. In the case
of AuG metric, there is a difference with respect the trend in
the values obtained with Au and Re when a message arrives
at layer l = 4. In the scenario that we have considered for
the experiments, the networks have a diameter of 5. When a
message arrives at a layer close to the diameter, the number
of agents in that layer is usually low. It is very likely that
there is an alternative shorter path to the agent that originated
the message. Therefore, the number of agents in that layer is
low with respect to the total of agents in the network and the
values of AuG are also low.
Taking into account the results of Reachability and Audi-
ence obtained in the experiments, we can conclude that the
network topology has a direct effect on the outreach of the
information published and therefore, in the proposed metrics.
Results also show that there is a high probability that in
a scenario where the agents’ privacy policy is ‘‘friends’’,
a publication reaches a layer l = 3, and inside this layer, in the
case of random networks, the percentage of agents that could
see the publication could arrive close to 30% of the network.
The results obtained with Reachability and Audience metrics
reinforce the theories of invisible audiences [5].
In spite of the Reachability and the Audience estimations
provide a suitable measurement of the privacy risk associ-
ated with a user’s publication action, the calculation of these
values presents limitations under certain situations. In real-
world scenarios, it is not always computationally affordable
the collection and analysis of a detailed record of the sharing
activity in an OSN. This becomes more complicated if the
OSN frequently modifies its structure. Moreover, the access
to users’ information and their activities in some OSN appli-
cations to third-party applications is not always possible.
It can also happen that even if we have access to the activity
of users, there are situations (e.g., when a new user joins the
social network) where we do not have information about the
previous activity of users. For these reasons, in the following
sections, we propose an approximation that evaluates the
use of structural network properties to estimate Reachability
and Audience metrics. Specifically, considering the previous
results, we have selected the Re(ai, l, r = one) and AuG
metrics for the following analysis.
C. CORRELATION BETWEEN PRIVACY METRICS AND
STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES
In this section, we present an approximation based on
structural network metrics. This approximation does not use
information about the traces of the paths follows by users’
messages in OSN. We analyzed the relationship between the
Reachability and the Audience of a user and his centrality
values.
1) GLOBAL STRUCTURAL CENTRALITY PROPERTIES
Initially, we considered global centrality metrics to evaluate
if there is a relationship between the privacy risk metrics
and centrality. These centrality metrics use information about
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FIGURE 4. Approximation of Reachability metric at layer l = 3 using global centrality metrics (different network topologies
considered).
TABLE 5. Dependence strength between global centrality properties and privacy risk (Reachability and Audience) values measured using the R2
coefficient. The best adjustments have been highlighted. Header columns correspond with random-walk betweenness centrality (RW_BC), closeness
centrality (CC), and eigenvector centrality (EC).
the entire network structure to be computed. Among the
global metrics, we have considered [31]: (i) random-walk
betweenness [32] that considers the number of times a ran-
dom walk between two pairs passes through the agent of
interest; (ii) closeness, that considers the average length of
the shortest paths between an agent and all other agents in
the network; and (iii) eigenvector, that gives each agent a
score proportional to the sum of the scores of his neigh-
bors. The values of the centrality metrics were normalized in
[0, 1] interval.
Using analytical regression, we study how each centrality
metric is related to the values of Reachability and Audience.
For this, we performed regression tests where a regressor is
launched for each centrality metric. Figures 4 and 5 show
the relationship between Reachability (or Audience) and
centrality values. The point color represents the number of
agents with specific values of the metrics. We considered
the R2 coefficient to determine how close the values of the
metrics are to the regression model. R2 values close to 1 indi-
cate that there is a high correlation between Reachability
VOLUME 7, 2019 143639
J. Alemany et al.: Metrics for Privacy Assessment When Sharing Information in OSNs
FIGURE 5. Approximation of Audience metric at layer l = 3 using global centrality metrics (different network topologies
considered).
(or Audience) and the centrality metric. The regression mod-
els considered in the experiments are linear, polynomial and
logarithmic.
First, we analyze the accuracy of global centrality mea-
sures to estimate the Reachability metric by layers (see
Table 5). In general, independently of the layer and
the network topology, the best results are obtained by the
random-walk betweenness centrality. Figure 4 shows the
relationship between the Re at layer 3 and global centrality
metrics in each network topology considered.We can observe
that the polynomial regressor model has slightly higher R2
values than the linear or the logarithmic. The polynomial
regressor model allows adjusting to a linear correlation, espe-
cially in the case of the small-world network, whereas in the
scale-free network and in some cases the random network
its behaviour tends to be curved and therefore it improves
remarkably to other adjustments.
Second, we analyze the accuracy of global centrality mea-
sures to estimate the Audience metric by layers (see Table 5).
The R2 coefficient values show that there is a clear rela-
tion between closeness centrality and the AuG metric. Fig-
ure 5 shows the relationship between the AuG metric at layer
3 and global centrality metrics in each network topology.
The polynomial regressor model provides the best R2 coef-
ficient values, especially in the case of the small-world
network. In the scale-free networks, the correlation values
between the global centrality metrics and the AuG are low,
except for closeness centrality metric. It can also observed
that for agents with high centrality values, their AuG values
are low. The main reason for these results is that in scale-free
topologies, when the AuG is calculated for layers close to the
network diameter (d= 5), the number of agents that have not
been received the message yet is low compared to the total
number of agents in the network.
Considering the global centrality measures analyzed,
random-walk betweenness metric provides a more fitted
approximation to Reachability metric, while closeness metric
provides a more fitted approximation to Audience metric.
Another phenomenon that can be observed is the distri-
bution of agents in different groups depending on network
topology and the metrics. In Figure 4, we observe that most
of the agents in small-world networks have high Re values
(values close to 0.9) compared to other network topologies,
and there are two extreme minorities: one with lower Re
values ([0.6, 0.85]) and another with slightly higherRe values
([0.9, 1]). In the scale-free networks, there is a small group
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FIGURE 6. Approximation of Reachability metric at layer l = 3 using local centrality metrics (different network topologies
considered).
of agents with high values of Re metric ([0.8, 1]) while the
rest of agents are distributed between 0.6 and 0.8 values of
Re. In the random networks, there is a core group with high
values (between 0.9 and 1) and a minority of agents with
values of Re between 0.7 and 0.9. Therefore, in this scenario,
the topologies where there is a large group of agents with
a high degree of Reachability are random and small world
networks.
Something similar occurs in Figure 5. In the small-world
network for layer l = 3, we observe that most of the
agents have intermediate AuG values (i.e., values close to
0.15) compared to other network topologies, and there are
two extreme minorities: one with slightly lower AuG values
([0.1, 0.12]) and another with slightly higher AuG values
([0.17, 0.22]). In the scale-free networks, there is a small
group of agents with high values of AuG metric ([0.15, 0.22])
while the rest of agents are distributed between 0.1 and
0.15 values of AuG. In the random networks, there is a core
group with relatively high values (0.35) and a minority of
agents with very low values of AuG. Therefore, in this sce-
nario, the topologies where there is a large group of agents
that can reach a wider audience are scale-free and random
networks.
2) LOCAL STRUCTURAL CENTRALITY PROPERTIES
Global structural centrality properties are suitable for social
networking services providers that have access to the network
structure. Otherwise, some OSN applications do not facili-
tate access to users’ information to third-party applications,
therefore it is not possible to infer the social network struc-
ture beyond the first layer. For these reasons, we have also
considered strictly local metrics to evaluate their suitability
to estimate Reachability and Audience values in layers.
Considering the limitations to calculate global centrality
metrics, in this section we examine local centrality metrics.
We considered degree, the number of links of an agent;
ego-betweenness, an ego-centric method to approximate the
betweenness centrality; and effectiveness, an ego-centric
method that measures the number of alters minus the average
degree of alters within the ego network, not counting ties to
ego network [1]. The effectiveness reflects the links that lead
to different people. A high value of effectiveness implies that
the agent can lead to a high number of different people.
Table 6 shows the results of the analysis of the relation
between Reachability and local centrality metrics in different
network topologies. It can be observed that the best results
are obtained with the effectiveness centrality. Figure 6 shows
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TABLE 6. Dependence strength between local centrality properties and privacy risk (Reachability and Audience) values measured using the R2
coefficient. The best adjustments have been highlighted. Header columns correspond with degree centrality (DC), ego betweenness centrality (EGO_BC),
and effectiveness (EF).
FIGURE 7. Approximation of Audience metric at layer l = 3 using local centrality metrics (different network topologies
considered).
the relation between Re values and local centrality values
for layer 3. In small-world networks, ego-betweenness and
effectiveness centrality metrics yield good results, in some
cases even better than global centrality metrics. In scale-free
networks, the relation between Re and local centrality metrics
is better than with global metrics. Moreover, we can observe
a logarithmic relation between Re and local centrality values,
especially in scale-free networks. In random networks, there
are no significant differences between global and local met-
rics and their relation to the Re metric.
Regarding the Audience metric, Table 6 shows the results
of the analysis of the relation between Audience and local
centrality metrics in different network topologies. It can be
observed that the best R2 values for small-world and ran-
dom network topologies are obtained using the effectiveness
centrality. In the case of scale-free network topologies, there
is only a high correlation values between AuG and local
centrality values for layer 2. Figure 7 shows the relation
between Audience values and local centrality values for layer
3. Ego-betweenness and effectiveness centrality metrics yield
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good results using a linear regressor. In scale-free networks,
the relation between Audience and local metrics is similar
to global metrics. We also observe a polynomial behavior
between Audience and local centrality values. In random
networks, there are no significant differences between global
and local metrics and their relation to the Audience metric.
Results show that local centrality metrics offer simi-
lar results to global metrics to estimate Reachability and
Audience values. Effectiveness centrality metric provides a
slightly higher fitted approximation using the logarithmic
regressor model. Results obtained with Effectiveness along
with the ease of its calculation allow us to make an estimation
of the proposed risk metrics (i.e., Reachability and Audience)
that will assess the user in the publication process of an
information item in an OSN.
If we observe the relation between the different values
of privacy risk metrics and the centrality measures (global
and local), we reach the following conclusions. Regarding
the global centrality metrics, closeness metric has a higher
correlation with privacy risk metrics, especially with Audi-
ence, in different network topologies than other global cen-
trality metrics. In the case of Reachability, random-walk
betweenness provides a higher degree of correlation. Regard-
ing local centrality metrics, effectiveness metric achieves the
best results both in the different network topologies and for
the different types of privacy risk metrics (i.e., Reachabil-
ity and Audience). Specifically, effectiveness metric yields
promising results comparable to global centrality measures
and close to the proposed privacy risk metrics (i.e., Reacha-
bility and Audience). Moreover, effectiveness facilitates the
estimation of privacy risk in scenarioswhere there is no global
knowledge or there is no previous information about users’
privacy policies or information flows. Effectiveness offers a
powerful advantage to provide real-time personalized solu-
tions to users when they post or share information through
ONS.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a new model of privacy
risk based on friendship layers. The concept of friendship
layers allows us to provide information about user’s privacy
risk for different levels of risk perception. Based on this
model, we propose two privacy risk metrics Reachability
and Audience. Reachability provides information to the user
about the probability that a message that he publishes reaches
a specific friendship layer or a specific number of users in
that layer. Audience provides information to the user about
the percentage of users in a specific layer that is probable that
see a message he published.
We evaluated the proposed Reachability and Audience
through simulations in different social network topologies
and considering different layers. The results show that
network topology has a direct effect on the outreach of
the information published when agents’ privacy policy is
‘‘friends’’. In the scenario analyzed, if an agent publishes a
message, there is a high probability (close to 0.9) that reaches
a layer l = 3 and the percentage of agents that could see the
publication will be close to 30% of the network. The results
of the simulations provide a real vision of the privacy risk
that is higher than the users risk initially might think, which
reinforces the theories of invisible audiences.
Finally, we consider a different approximation of Reacha-
bility and Audience for scenarios where there is no previous
information about users activity or the information about the
traces of the messages cannot be obtained. The proposed
approximations are based on structural centrality metrics.
We analyzed the relation between Reachability and Audience
and centrality metrics. We considered global centrality met-
rics that have a complete overview of the structure of the
network and the local centrality metrics that only consider
local information. Regarding the global centrality metrics,
the results show that, to estimate the Reachability metric the
best results are obtained by the random-walk betweenness
centrality. To estimate the Audience metric the best results
are obtained by the closeness centrality. Regarding local cen-
trality metrics, effectiveness is the most suitable property to
approximate Reachability. In the case of the relation between
Reachability and centrality metrics, there are no relevant
differences between the degree of correlation values obtained
with global or local metrics. To estimate the Audience using
local centrality metrics, in small-world and random networks,
the best results are obtained with effectiveness centrality. For
scale-free networks, effectiveness provides good results for
the estimation of Audience in layers that are not close to the
network diameter. Based on these results, we propose a com-
mon regression model based on the effectiveness centrality
values of agents to approximate Reachability and Audience
values in different network models.
As future work, we plan to validate Reachability and
Audience metrics in a real scenario that allows us to obtain
users’ feedback to evaluate the suitability of the proposed
metrics. We also plan the analysis of the effects of different
informative methods to show the users’ privacy risk in an
online social network. Finally, we will extend the proposed
metrics with the inclusion of new factors about the users
(such as personality and trust) and about the publication
(such as sensitivity and virality). These factors may have a
great influence on the diffusion of a message in the social
network and provide a more precise approximation about the
publications’ scope.
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